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ABSTRACT 
 
WEB SERVICES SECURITY: A PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR 
INTERDOMAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
 
 Web services technology is vulnerable to security threats similar to other 
technologies which are based on communication over internet. Some applications 
working over internet typically require strong authentication. The security requirements 
of a scenario may involve interdomain authentication mechanisms. These domains may 
be operating using different technologies.  
 In order to enable such scenarios, we leverage existing approaches with 
emerging standards and propose an architecture. Our proposed architecture takes 
advantage of XML technology and emerging SAML standard. The most important aim 
of the proposed architecture is platform indepedence.  
 Our proposed architecture includes a Security Token Service and a protocol for 
communication between token requesters, consumers and issuers. Although, the exact 
flow of execution depends on the scenario, we believe our approaches can be used as 
common ground for implementation. 
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ÖZET 
 
WEB SERVSLER GÜVENL: ÇALIMA ALANLARI ARASI 
GÜVEN LKS ÇN BR MMAR ÖNERS 
 
 Web Servisleri teknolojisi internet üzerinden iletiime dayanan dier teknolojiler 
ile aynı güvenlik tehditlerine açıktır. nternet üzerinden çalıan kimi uygulamalar güçlü 
kimlik dorulamasını talep ederler. Bir senaryonun güvenlik talepleri, çalıma alanları 
arası kimlik dorulama mekanizmalarına ihtiyaç duyabilir. Bu çalıma alanları farklı 
teknolojiler kullanarak çalııyor olabilir. 
 Bu tip senaryolara imkan salamak amacıyla, varolan yaklaımları yeni 
gelimekte olan standartlarla birletirip bir mimari öneriyoruz. Önerdiimiz mimari 
XML teknolojilerinden ve gelimekte olan SAML standardından faydalanmaktadır. 
Önerilen mimarinin en temel amacı platform baımsızlııdır. 
 Önerilen mimari bir güvenlik jetonu servisi ve jetonu talep edenler, kullananlar 
ve yayınlayanlar arasındaki iletiimi salamak için bir protokolü içerir. Senaryoların 
kesin akıı duruma balı olarak deiebilir, ancak inancımız yaklaımlarımızın 
uygulama gelitirmek için bir temel olarak kullanılabilecei yönündedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Web services technology, which enables disparate systems to interoperate at a 
high level with ease, lacked a common framework for security. Although some attempts 
have been made to solve this problem, most of these attempts bring a solution using 
variations of technologies already in use. These techniques, which are actually proven in 
the field, do not fit with the interoperable and loosely coupled nature of Web services 
technology. The new emerging Web Service Security (WS-Security) standard, along 
with other extensions of the WS-* group of technologies aims this lack of a common 
security framework. 
 The Web Services Security standard is formed by independent organizations 
backed by big vendors of the industry such as IBM, Microsoft, RSA, and Verisign. 
Although, some alignment in vision has been achieved, in practice there is still a hot 
debate. This debate, although a good thing for advancement of technology, results in a 
slow penetration of technology. Proven products leveraging these technologies are still 
missing.  
 This thesis aims to provide an understanding of this new technology and 
proposes architecture for a custom scenario, which we believe is comprehensive and 
extensible. The design and architecture of the case study examined in this thesis, is 
implemented using a mix of several Web services security specifications. Although 
there are alternative specifications still competing to become de facto standards, we 
believe our selection of specifications had recently gained momentum and success in 
becoming a de facto standard in the near future. The architecture proposed in this thesis, 
can be extended to achieve to enable larger scenarios or can be downsized and used 
partially for more common smaller use cases. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WEB SERVICES 
 
2.1. Introduction to Web Services 
 
 This chapter introduces Web Services, a technology that enables an application 
to invoke another application over the Internet leveraging the existing standards and 
protocols. The formal definition for Web Services as defined by W3C is: 
A Web Service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-
to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web Service 
in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP-messages, typically conveyed 
using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards 
“(WEB_1 2006)”. 
 During the development of this technology, focus was put on making functional 
building blocks accessible over standard Internet protocols that are independent from 
platforms and programming languages. Therefore, different software systems, running 
on different platforms, developed using different technologies can interact if they 
leverage Web Services technology. These systems can be new applications or existing 
legacy systems wrapped around with an additional layer to make them Internet-enabled. 
As a consequence of this, applications which has become services, can rely on and 
cooperate with each other to achieve new goals. 
 
2.2. A Short History of Web Services 
 
 With the spread of Internet, it became clear that the infrastructure that was 
introduced by Internet could be used not just to retrieve information that was to be 
presented using a browser (called human-to-application, H2A applications). Rather, 
there was also an increased demand for application-to-application (A2A) 
communication using the existing technologies. Existing protocols were used in order to 
achieve this goal. However, not long after, it became obvious that existing protocols fell 
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short of accomplishing this goal. The HTTP protocol does not provide for complex 
applications that arise from A2A scenarios. 
 In late 1999, an XML based protocol, namely the SOAP protocol was published 
by the Microsoft Corporation, which could be used for A2A scenarios. IBM 
Corporation started supporting the SOAP protocol in early 2000 followed by the public 
acceptance of SOAP by the industry. In May, 2000 the SOAP protocol was submitted to 
the W3C Consortium and in June, 2003 it was released as a W3C Recommendation.  
Numerous other protocols for supporting and extending Web Services 
development have been published. Some of the most important protocols are, WDSL, 
UDDI, and the WS-* suite of protocols. We will be examining the WSDL and UDDI 
protocols briefly in the next section, and WS-Security protocol, which is part of the 
WS-* suite of protocols, in the fourth chapter. 
 
2.2. Web Services Protocol Stack 
 
Web Services are a set of protocols based on XML. The following protocols 
formed the initial specification for the Web Services. The lifecycle for a general web 
service life cycle scenario is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) – The formal set of conventions governing the 
format and processing rules of a SOAP message. These conventions include the 
interactions among SOAP nodes generating and accepting SOAP messages for the 
purpose of exchanging information along a SOAP path “(WEB_1 2006)”.  
 
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) - WSDL or Web Services Description 
language is an XML format for describing network services as a set of endpoints 
operating on messages containing either document-oriented or procedure-oriented 
information. The operations and messages are described abstractly, and then bound to a 
concrete network protocol and message format to define an endpoint. Related concrete 
endpoints are combined into abstract endpoints (services). WSDL is extensible to allow 
description of  
endpoints and their messages regardless of what message formats or network protocols 
are used to communicate “(WEB_1 2006)”. 
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Universal Discovery, Description, Integration (UDDI) – UDDI is the technical 
foundation for publication and discovery of Web Services implementations both within 
and between enterprises “(WEB_2 2006)”.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Basic operation of Web Service Entities 
 
 These standards have effectively become de facto standards, with effectively 
universal acceptance and widespread implementation by vendors. However, to improve 
the security and reliability of Web Services and to address more complex business 
scenarios, a wide range of additional protocols have since been proposed. Some of these 
protocols have been standardized, and some are in the process of being standardized. 
There also some subjects still lacking any common consensus. This stack of 
technologies is presented in Figure 2.2. A Categorization Web Services standards is as 
follows; 
1. Description and discovery 
2. Messaging 
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3. Management 
4. Business Processes 
5. Transactions 
6. Security 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Web Services Stack 
 
2.3. Web Services Architectural Models 
 
 Web Services Architecture has four basic models. Each model is named after 
what may be viewed as the key concept of that model. The four models are: 
 
1. The Message Oriented Model 
2. The Service Oriented Model 
3. The Resource Oriented Model 
4. The Policy Model 
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2.3.1. The Message Oriented Model 
 
 The Message Oriented Model focuses on messages, message structure, and 
message transport without particular reference as to reasons for the messages, nor to 
their significance. Specifically, in this model, we are not concerned with any semantic 
significance of the content of a message or its relationship to other messages. However, 
the Message Oriented Model does focus on the structure of the messages, on the 
relationship between message sender and receivers and how messages are transmitted. 
 
2.3.2. The Service Oriented Model 
 
 The Service Oriented Model focuses on aspects of service, action and so on. 
While clearly, in any distributed system, services can not be adequately realized without 
some means of messaging, the converse is not the case: messages do not need to relate 
to services. 
 The Service Oriented Model makes use of meta-data which is a key property of 
Service Oriented Architectures. This meta-data is used to document many aspects of 
services: from the details of the interface and transport binding to the semantics of the 
service and what policy restrictions there may be on the service. 
 
2.3.3. The Resource Oriented Model 
 
 The Resource Oriented Model focuses on resources that exist and have owners. 
Resources are a fundamental concept that underpins much of the Web and much of Web 
services; for example, a Web service is a particular kind of resource that is important to 
this architecture. 
 
2.3.4. The Policy Model 
 
 The Policy Model focuses on constraints on the behavior of agents and services. 
We generalize this to resources since policies can apply equally to documents (such as 
descriptions of services) as well as active computational resources.  
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The Policy Model focuses on those aspects of the architecture that relate to 
policies and, by extension, security and quality of service. Security is fundamentally 
about constraints; about constraints on the behavior on action and on accessing 
resources. Similarly, quality of service is also about constraints on service. In the PM, 
these constraints are modeled around the core concept of policy; and the relationships 
with other elements of the architecture. Thus the PM is a framework in which security 
can be realized. 
 
2.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Web Services Technology 
 
 Compared to other technologies for building distributed systems, The Web 
Services technology naturally has advantages and disadvantages. The keen focus on 
leveraging existing infrastructure during the initial design phase of the technology 
provides the foundation for its advantages, while its test based nature results in both 
some of the advantages and disadvantages. 
 Web Services provide interoperability between various software applications 
running on disparate platforms/operating systems. Web services use open standards and 
protocols. Protocols and data formats are text-based where possible, making it easy for 
developers to comprehend. XML is the agreed upon data format universally used by 
Web Services implementations. Its text based nature is not actually a requirement as 
commonly mentioned but rather a choice of serialization mechanism. However, 
regardless of the serialization mechanism, the data format specified by the XML Infoset 
is universally the same, thus enabling interoperability across platforms. 
 Web Services technology utilizes the HTTP protocol, therefore, can work 
through many common firewall security measures while other forms of RPC may often 
be blocked. This is an important advantage of the technology from a systems 
management and security point of view. 
 Web Services are loosely coupled thereby facilitating a distributed approach to 
application integration. Loosely Coupled systems are considered useful when either the 
source or the destination computer systems are subject to frequent changes. 
 On the other hand, Web Services technology suffers from the fact that it is 
relatively a new technology. Important standards such as transactions are currently 
nonexistent or are very immature, compared to mature distributed computing standards 
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such as CORBA. This is likely to be a temporary issue, since most vendors have 
committed to the Web Services technology around two main organizational bodies, 
namely the W3C and OASIS. Lacking standards are in the process of creation. 
 Another drawback of Web Services might be its poor performance compared to 
other distributed computing approaches. This is a common problem with text based 
encoding approaches. Although XML does not consider conciseness or efficiency of 
parsing among its goals, new standards such as the XML Infoset provides other viable 
alternatives by describing XML in terms of abstractions. Consequently, binary 
serialization of XML documents becomes an equally valid alternative. Also SOAP 
MOTM standard promises to improve the wire efficiency of XML. 
 
2.5. An Evaluation of the Current Architecture 
 
 We believe the architecture proposed by the W3C working group substantially 
meets the requirements for a complete distributed system with the exception of security 
and privacy. Although there exists substantial material that lays the foundation for 
addressing these, there is definitely room for more work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WEB SERVICES SECURITY 
 
3.1 A Security Primer 
 
 Since the early days of the Internet as a universal network open to anyone, 
secure information exchange has been a concern. While it is worth noting that there is 
no absolute security, without an appropriate level of security, the commercial 
exploitation of the Internet would not be feasible. While defining a security model, how 
data flow through an application and over a network to meet the requirements defined 
by the business without exposing the data to any risk must be shown. 
 There are seven requirements that must be addressed by a general security 
framework as defined by the ISO Security Standard: 
1. Identification: The party accessing the resource is able to identify itself to 
the system. 
2. Authentication: Authentication is the process of validating the user, whether 
a client is valid in a particular context. A client can be an end user, a machine or an 
application. 
3. Authorization: Authorization is the process of checking whether the 
authenticated user has access to the requested resource. 
4. Integrity: Ensure that the information will not be changed, altered, or lost in 
an unauthorized or accidental manner. 
5. Confidentiality: No unauthorized party or process can access or disclose the 
information. 
6. Auditing: All transactions are recorded so that problems can be analyzed 
after the fact. 
7. Non-repudiation: Both parties are able to provide legal proof to a third party 
that the sender did send the information, and the receiver received the identical 
information. Neither involved side is unable to deny. 
Some classifications also include availability to be a part of the schema above 
schema meaning that hostile attack can not achieve denial-of-service by allocating too 
many system resources. In this dissertation, we will not deal with this security aspect. 
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3.2 Web Services Security Exposures 
 
 Web Services security is one of the most important Web Services subjects. 
When using Web Services, similar security exposures exist as for other Internet, 
middleware-based applications and communications. To demonstrate the Web Services 
security exposures, we are going to explain several major risk factors for a system with 
no security. Most common security risks has been depicted in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Web Services Scenario with No Security 
 
Spoofing – no authentication: An attacker could send a modified SOAP 
message to the service provider, pretending to be a legitimate user, to get confidential 
information, or to perform unauthorized acts. By applying authentication to the Web 
Service, this security exposure can be eliminated. 
 
Tampering – no integrity: The soap message is intercepted between the Web 
Service client and the server. An attacker could modify the message en-route and since 
there is no integrity constraint, the Web Service server does not check if the message is
 11 
valid and will accept the modified transaction. By applying a confidentiality mechanism 
to the Web Service, this security exposure can be eliminated. 
 
Eavesdropping – no confidentiality: An attacked could intercept the SOAP 
message and read all contained information. Because the message is not encrypted, 
confidential information can be obtained by the attacker. This exposure exists since the 
message is sent in plain text. By applying a confidentiality mechanism, this security 
exposure can be eliminated. 
 
3.3. Security Measures for Web Services 
 
 When enabling security for any application, the real challenge is in 
understanding and assessing the risk involved and applying the appropriate measures. 
For Web Services, knowing what security technology exists today, tracking new 
emerging standards, and understanding how they will be used to offset the risk is 
crucial. 
 
3.3.1. General Effect of Security on Information Systems 
 
 The more security mechanisms implemented, which increases the security 
effect, the more influence on other non-functional requirements is given. Therefore, 
when designing a Web Services security solution, one has to keep in mind that security 
has an impact on several non-functioning requirements. 
 
3.3.1.1. Security Effect on System Capacity 
 
 Any applied security mechanism has an impact on system resource usage, such 
as processor and memory usage. Therefore, when planning a Web Service environment, 
the required security overhead must be considered in the capacity and volume planning. 
 The non-functional requirements, capacity and volume, cover for example the 
number of concurrent users, and the number of transactions per second. This has 
influence on the required system infrastructure in terms of hardware and network. 
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3.3.1.2. Security Effect on Performance 
 
 Security mechanisms and functions also impact the applications response time. 
When defining the Web Service system response time requirements, one has to mind 
that the response time will be affected when applying the security. 
 The performance requirement for a system defined the response time for a main 
application operation (for example: less than 1 second response time for 90% of all 
transactions). 
 
3.3.2. Web Services Security Approaches 
 
 Threats to Web Services involve threats to the host system, the application and 
the entire network infrastructure. To secure Web Services, a range of XML-based 
security mechanisms are needed to solve problems related to authentication, role based 
access control, distributed security policy enforcement, message layer security that 
accommodate the presence of intermediaries. Web services implementations may 
require point-to-point and/or end-to-end security mechanisms, depending upon the 
degree of threat or risk. Traditional, connection-oriented, point-to-point security 
mechanisms may not meet the end-to-end security requirements of Web services. 
However, security is a balance of assessed risk and cost of countermeasures. Depending 
on implementers risk tolerance, point to point transport level security can provide 
enough security countermeasures. 
 
3.3.2.1. Security Policies 
 
 Three fundamental concepts related to Web services security exist from the 
perspective of Web services architecture: the resources that must be secured, the 
mechanisms by which these resources are secured, and policies, which are machine-
processable documents describing constraints on these resources. 
 Policies can be logically broken into two main types: permission policies and 
obligatory policies. A permission policy concerns those actions that an entity is 
permitted to perform and an obligatory policy concerns those actions that an entity is 
required to perform. Due to their nature, these two different kinds of policies have 
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different types of enforcement mechanisms. A permission policy guard mechanism can 
be used to verify that a requested action is permitted to be performed by the entity, 
while the obligatory guard mechanism can only verify after the fact that an obligation 
has not been met. The architecture is principally concerned with the existence of such 
guard mechanisms and their role in the architecture. 
 Not all guards are active processes. For example, confidentiality of messages is 
provided by encryption. The guard here is the encryption itself, although this may be 
further backed up by active guards that apply policy. 
 
3.3.2.2. Message Level Security 
 
 Traditional network level security mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security 
(SSL/TLS), Virtual Private Networks (VPN), IPSec (Internet Protocol Security), and 
Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Exchange (S/MIME) are point-to-point technologies. 
Although these traditional technologies may be used for Web services security, they are 
not sufficient for providing an end-to-end security context, ad Web services use a 
message oriented approach that enables complex interactions that can include the 
routing of messaged across various trust domains. 
 Therefore, message level security is important as opposed to point-to-point 
transport level security. As can be seen in figure 3.2 below, the security context of 
SOAP message is end-to-end. However, there may also be a need for the intermediary 
to have access to some information in the message. This is illustrated as a security 
context between the intermediary and the original requester agent, and the intermediary 
and the ultimate receiver. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Point-to-point vs. End-to-end Security 
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3.3.2.3. Transport Level Security 
 
 HTTP, the most widely used Internet communication protocol, is currently also 
the most popular protocol for Web services. HTTP is an inherently insecure protocol 
since all information is sent in clear text between unauthenticated peers over an insecure 
network. To secure HTTP transport-level security can be used. Transport-level security 
is a well known and often used mechanism for securing Internet and Intranet 
communications. It is based on Secure Sockets Layer or Transport Layer Security that 
works beneath HTTP. 
 HTTPS allows client and server side authentication through certificates, which 
have been either self-signed or signed by a central agency. HTTPS can be combined 
with any part of message level security. 
 Although HTTPS does not cover all aspects of a general security framework, it 
provides a security level regarding party identification and authentication, message 
integrity and confidentiality. SSL can not be applied to other protocols such as JMS. 
Using SSL point-to-point security can be achieved. 
 
3.3.3. Web Services Security Technologies 
 
 In Web services, the SOAP envelope is defined in XML, thus, Web services can 
use many of the existing XML security technologies and standards, such as XML 
encryption and XML Digital Signatures. In addition many new standards such as WS-
Security have emerged. The WS-Security is the cornerstone of all the efforts in pulling 
all these requirements together. The abstract of WS-Security specification document 
says that “WS-Security describes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide quality 
of protection through message integrity, message confidentiality, and single message 
authentication. These mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of 
security models and encryption technologies.”[3] Other technologies in the process of 
standardization are XML Key Management Specification (XKMS), Secure Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML), Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), 
and Identity Federation. 
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3.3.3.1. XML Signature and XML Encryption 
 
 XML signatures are designed for use in XML transactions. It is a standard that is 
jointly developed by W3C and the IETF (RFC 2807 and RFC 3275). The standard 
defines a schema for capturing the result of a digital signature operation applied to 
arbitrary data and its processing. XML signatures add authentication, data integrity, and 
support for non-repudiation to the signed data. 
 XML Encryption specifies a process for encrypting the data and representing the 
result in XML. The data may be arbitrary data (including an XML document), an XML 
element, or XML element content. The result of encrypting data is an XML Encryption 
element which contains or references the cipher data. 
 
3.3.3.2. Web Services Security 
 
 The WS-Security specification provides message-level security, which is used 
when building secure Web services to implement message content integrity and 
confidentiality. The advantage of using WS-Security over using SSL is that WS-
Security can provide message level end-to-end security. This means that security can be 
maintained even if the message goes through multiple services, called intermediaries. 
Additionally, WS-Security is independent of the transport layer protocol meaning that it 
can be used for any Web service binding such as HTTP or RMI. 
 The WS-Security specification defines a set of SOAP extensions. The 
specification is flexible and is designed to be used as the basis for securing Web 
services in a wide variety of security models, including PKI, Kerberos and SSL. It 
provides support for multiple security token formats, multiple trust domains, multiple 
signature formats, and multiple encryption technologies based on XML signature and 
XML encryption to provide integrity and confidentiality. 
 The specification includes security token propagation, message integrity, and 
message confidentiality. However, these mechanisms by themselves do not address all 
the aspects of a complete security solution, therefore, WS-Security represents only one 
of the layers in a complex, secure Web services security solution design. 
Message integrity is provided by leveraging XML signature in conjunction with 
security tokens (which may contain or imply key data) to ensure that messages are 
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transmitted without modifications. The integrity mechanisms are designed to support 
multiple signatures potentially by multiple actors, and to be extensible to support 
additional signature formats. The signatures may reference a security token. 
Similarly, message confidentiality is provided by leveraging XML Encryption in 
conjunction with security tokens to keep portions of SOAP messages confidential. The 
encryption mechanisms are designed to support additional encryption technologies, 
processes, and operations by multiple actors. The encryption might also reference a 
security token “(IBM CORPORATION, 2002)”. 
 
3.3.3.2.1. Advantages of WS-Security 
 
 Multiple parts of a message can be secured in different ways. Multiple security 
requirements can be applied, such as integrity on the security token, and confidentiality on 
the SOAP body. End-to-end message level security can be provided through any number 
of intermediaries. WS-Security works across multiple transports and is independent of the 
underlying transport. Authentication of multiple party identities is possible. 
 
3.3.3.2.2. Evolution of WS-Security Specification 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Evolution of WS-Security Specification 
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 The first version of WS-Security specification was proposed by IBM, Microsoft, 
and Verisign in April 2002. After the formalization of the April 2002 specifications, the 
specification was transferred to OASIS consortium. 
 In OASIS activities, the core specification and many profiles that describe the 
use of a specific token framework in WS-Security have been discussed. The latest 
specification and profiles of WS-Security were proposed in March 2004 as an OASIS 
standard. 
 The latest core specification, Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 
1.0 (WS-Security 2004) was standardized in March 2004. The two profiles, Web 
Services Security Username Token Profile, and Web Services Security X.509 
Certificate Token Profile 1.0 were standardized at the same time. This evolution is 
presented in Figure 3.3. 
 There are other token profiles on which OASIS is currently working on: 
• Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 
• Web Services Security: Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile 
• Web Services Security: Kerberos Token Profile 
• Web Services Security: Minimalist Profile (MProf) 
• Web Services Security: SOAP Message with Attachments (SWA) Profile 
 
3.3.3.2.3. Web Services Security Model Framework 
 
 The WS-Security specification addresses only a subset of security services for 
all security aspects. A more general security model is required to cover other security 
aspects such as auditing and non-repudiation. 
 The Web services security model introduces a set of individual interrelated 
specifications to form a layering approach to security. This layered architecture is 
presented in Figure 3.4. It includes several aspects of security: identification, 
authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, auditing, and non-repudiation. 
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Figure 3.4 Web Services Security Specifications 
 
These specifications include different aspects of Web services security: 
WS-Policy – Describes the capabilities and constraints of the security (and other 
business) policies on intermediaries and endpoints (e.g. required security tokens, 
supported encryption algorithms, privacy rules). 
WS-Trust – Describes a model for trust frameworks that enables Web services to 
securely interoperate. 
WS-Privacy – Describes a model for how Web services and requesters state 
subject privacy preferences and organizational privacy practice statements. 
WS-SecureConversation – Describes how to manage and authenticate message 
exchanges between parties including security context exchange and establishing and 
deriving session keys. 
WS-Federation – Describes how to manage and broker the trust relations in a 
heterogeneous federated environment including support for federated identities. 
WS-Authorization – Describes how to manage authorization and data and 
authorization policies. 
 
3.3.3.2.4. WS-Security Example 
 
 This section provides examples of SOAP messages with WS-Security. Using 
WS-Security, the authentication mechanism integrity, and confidentiality can be applied 
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at the message level. As an overview, Figure 3.5 shows an example of Web service 
security elements when the SOAP body is signed and encrypted. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 SOAP Message Security with WS-Security 
 
 Example 3.1 shows the sample SOAP message without applying WS-Security. 
As you can see, there is only a SOAP body under the SOAP envelope. Applying WS-
Security, the SOAP security header will be inserted under the SOAP envelope. 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
      <soapenv:Header/> 
      <soapenv:Body> 
      <p821:getDayForecast xmlns:p821="http://bean.itso"> 
            <theDate>2004-11-25T15:00:00.000Z</theDate> 
      </p821:getDayForecast> 
      </soapenv:Body> 
      </soapenv:Envelope> 
 
Example 3.1 SOAP message without WS-Security 
 
 In the sections that follow, we will show examples with WS-Security applied to 
the SOAP message. 
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3.3.3.2.4.1. Authentication 
 
 In example 3.2, we show a message with authentication. As can be seen, we 
have a username and password information as a <UsernameToken> tag in the message 
“(OASIS, 2006)”. When the username token is received by the Web service server, the 
username and password are extracted and verified. Only when the username and 
password combination is valid will the message be accepted and processed at the server. 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
      <soapenv:Header> 
         <wsse:Security soapenv:mustUnderstand="1" 
              xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401 - 
wsswssecurity- secext-1.0.xsd"> 
            <wsse:UsernameToken> 
            <wsse:Username>David</wsse:Username> 
            <wsse:Password 
                        Type="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-
wssusername- 
                         token-profile-1.0#PasswordText">divaD</wsse:Password> 
            </wsse:UsernameToken> 
         </wsse:Security> 
      </soapenv:Header> 
      <soapenv:Body> 
      <p821:getDayForecast xmlns:p821="http://bean.itso"> 
            <theDate>2004-11-25T15:00:00.000Z</theDate> 
      </p821:getDayForecast> 
      </soapenv:Body> 
      </soapenv:Envelope> 
 
Example 3.2 SOAP Message with Authentication 
 
 Using the username token is just one of the ways of implementing 
authentication. This mechanism is also known as basic authentication. Any XML based 
security token can be specified in the <Security> header. However, binary tokens such 
as X.509 certificates, and Kerberos tickets, or other non-XML formats require a special 
encoding format for inclusion. 
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3.3.3.2.4.2. Integrity 
 
 Integrity is applied to the application to ensure that no one illegally modifies the 
message while it is in transit. Essentially, integrity is provided by generating an XML 
digital signature on the contents of the SOAP message. If the message data changes 
illegally, the signature would no longer be valid. 
 Example 3.3 shows a sample SOAP message with integrity. Here the message 
body part is signed and added to the SOAP security header as signature information.  
 
<saml:Assertion AssertionID="SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-4100-ad21-
13013b975f3c" 
MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1" 
Issuer="http://localhost/SamlSecurityTokenService/SamlTokenIssuer.ashx" 
IssueInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"> 
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" NotOnOrAfter="2005-11- 
30T02:36:03Z"> 
<saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
<saml:Audience> 
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing/role/anonymous 
</saml:Audience> 
</saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
</saml:Conditions> 
<saml:AuthenticationStatement 
AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password" 
AuthenticationInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z"> 
<saml:Subject> 
<saml:NameIdentifier 
Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/username">RDALAPTOP
02\wse 
user</saml:NameIdentifier> 
<saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
<saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:holder-ofkey</ 
saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<xenc:EncryptedKey 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
<xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
<KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
 
 
Example 3.3 SOAP Message with Integrity 
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<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-
soapmessage- 
security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
<xenc:CipherData> 
<xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnbOFNj1lxQd
XCTi7z3aaLu4Xi 
ws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4ygqyB+Mx4J2lKLYl+rxI
OVOVcjbd64/YngQu5 
AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4=</xenc:CipherValue> 
</xenc:CipherData> 
</xenc:EncryptedKey> 
</ds:KeyInfo> 
</saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
</saml:Subject> 
<saml:SubjectLocality IPAddress="192.168.0.10" DNSAddress="CLIENTHOST" /> 
</saml:AuthenticationStatement> 
<saml:AttributeStatement> 
<saml:Subject> 
<saml:NameIdentifier 
Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/username">RDALAPTOP
02\wse 
user</saml:NameIdentifier> 
<saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
<saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:holder-ofkey</ 
saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<xenc:EncryptedKey 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
<xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
<KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-
soapmessage- 
security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
<xenc:CipherData> 
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<xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnbOFNj1lxQd
XCTi7z3aaLu4Xi 
ws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4ygqyB+Mx4J2lKLYl+rxI
OVOVcjbd64/YngQu5 
AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4=</xenc:CipherValue> 
</xenc:CipherData> 
</xenc:EncryptedKey> 
</ds:KeyInfo> 
</saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
</saml:Subject> 
<saml:Attribute AttributeName="group" 
AttributeNamespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/group"> 
<saml:AttributeValue>BUILTIN\Users</saml:AttributeValue> 
</saml:Attribute> 
</saml:AttributeStatement> 
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo> 
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-excc14n#" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" /> 
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" 
/> 
<Reference URI="#SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-4100-ad21-13013b975f3c"> 
<Transforms> 
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#envelopedsignature" 
/> 
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
</Transforms> 
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
<DigestValue>k2PBIDmwJLlQIh/GA4bVPgk1544=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</SignedInfo> 
<SignatureValue>CZPQJvc2vpjKyio6EEJTQShHGlJff1hZubOWSDCbRrbSFkK53fOp
9Ugulfel6vvs9y 
ZfFJB2ieRAPK3ywUrRWTKvO7vjXP9HRGgrvqGC2PpQNAEYn7ciBkLM+VoJV5v
WfIopVevEYvnxFMFZlJTl 
LSOr0n+GWYaZuUYFJECfHaE=</SignatureValue> 
<KeyInfo> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasiswss- 
soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" EncodingType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">vLfjdZyxqw+ztcYkVVQX8wyXp5o=</wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</saml:Assertion> 
 
Example 3.3 (Continued) 
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 A signature is based on a key that the sender is authorized to have. Unauthorized 
sniffers do not have this key. When the receiver gets the message, it too creates a 
signature using message contents. Only if the two signatures match does the receiver 
honor the message. If the signatures are different, a SOAP fault is returned to the sender. 
 
3.3.3.2.4.3. Confidentiality 
 
 Example 3.4 shows a sample SOAP message with confidentiality. Here, the 
message body part is encrypted and a security header with encryption information added. 
Confidentiality is the process in which a SOAP message is protected so that only authorized 
recipients can read the SOAP message. Confidentiality is provided by encrypting the 
contents of the SOAP message using XML encryption. If the SOAP message is encrypted, 
only a service that knows the key can decrypt and read the message. 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
      xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
      xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
      xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
      <soapenv:Header> 
            <wsu:Timestamp 
                  xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-ws 
                  security-utility-1.0.xsd"> 
                  <wsu:Created>2004-11-26T09:34:50.838Z</wsu:Created> 
             </wsu:Timestamp> 
             <wsse:Security soapenv:mustUnderstand="1" 
                  xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-w 
                  ssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"> 
                    <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
                          <EncryptionMethod 
                                 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
                                 <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
                                       <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                                       <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                                       ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis- 
                                     200401-wss-x509-token-profile-
1.0#X509v3SubjectKeyIdentifier"> 
Vniy7MUOXBumPoH1MNbDpiIWOPA= 
                                        </wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
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                                        </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                                  </ds:KeyInfo> 
                           <CipherData> 
                                 <CipherValue> 
O+2mTsRjU1iNlwANv1kGdzpkRV1GQc5epAT3p5Eg5UNAJ3H3YAX5VrdgMQmj1 
wzdSZLDEzBtcHPJq3c8c0AgmAy9EVdcgXIn/ZeV+80jMDn/HN2HfodYjURtIYBg48
0SSkot0fy+YpBSXNR/MTfs1HT2H/Mjw/CyIbomWdQZHmE= 
                                  </CipherValue> 
                            </CipherData> 
                            <ReferenceList> 
                    
<DataReferenceURI="#wssecurity_encryption_id_6866950837840688804"/> 
                            </ReferenceList> 
                    </EncryptedKey> 
            </wsse:Security> 
      </soapenv:Header> 
      <soapenv:Body> 
            <EncryptedData 
                  Id="wssecurity_encryption_id_6866950837840688804" 
                  Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
                  xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
                  <EncryptionMethod 
                        Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc"/> 
                  <CipherData> 
                        <CipherValue> 
OvLekOlbuZhFBllBNL4Kos195YHwYw0kSbMxkbI2pk7nl17g0prPS2Ba2hyrXHABG
QVmosWpgqt+zijCPHUQCMwmm3qgFraK11DPMmwP94HvgxlgBmPw1Unt+WM4
aKLNrHDnwwcQX5RO7KT+fhFp4wxFEABwfHqzvTGNK3xRwJE= 
                         </CipherValue> 
                  </CipherData> 
            </EncryptedData> 
      </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
 
Example 3.4 (Continued) 
 
3.3.3.2.5. Scenarios 
 
 In this section, we present several scenarios that can be enabled using the 
mentioned Web Service security specifications. These scenarios can be commonly 
encountered in the industry, and present an opportunity for elaborating on the 
specifications. 
 Note that in the scenario descriptions the use of the term requester is used to 
describe the broad variety potential users of a Web service and is not meant to limit the 
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characteristics of the requester. In scenario figures, the blue boxes represent the service 
and the light blue boxes represent security tokens and their identity and delegation 
claims. 
 
3.3.3.2.5.1.  Direct Trust Using Username/Password and Transport-
Level Security  
 
 This is a very basic example showing how Web services Security can be used 
with existing security mechanisms. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Web Services Security and Existing Transport Security Mechanisms 
 
 The requester opens a connection to the Web Service using a secure transport 
such as SSL or TLS. It sends its request along with a security token that contains its 
username and password. The service authenticates the requester, processes the request 
and returns the result. In this scenario, the message confidentiality and integrity are 
handled using existing transport security mechanisms “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
3.3.3.2.5.2. Direct Trust Using Security Tokens 
 
 This scenario illustrates the use of a security token that is directly trusted by a 
Web service. Here direct trust means that the requester’s security token or its signing 
authority is known and trusted by the Web service. This scenario assumes that the two 
parties have used some mechanism to establish a trust relationship for use of the 
security token. This trust may be established manually, by configuring the application, 
or by using secure transport to exchange keys.  
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Figure 3.7 Direct Trust between Two Parties 
 
 The requester sends a message to a service and includes a signed security token 
and provides proof of possession of the security token using, for example, a signature. 
The service verifies the proof and evaluates the security token. The signature on the 
security token is valid and is directly trusted by the service. The service processes the 
request and returns a result. Direct trust assumes that the policies for privacy are well 
understood by the parties involved “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
3.3.3.2.5.3 Security Token Acquisition  
 
 In some cases, the security token used is not passed as part of the message, and 
instead a security token reference is provided that can be used to locate and acquire the token. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Security Tokens by Reference 
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 The requester issues a request to the service and includes a reference to the 
security token and provides proof-of-possession. The Web service uses the provided 
information to obtain the security token from the token store service and validate the 
proof. The Web service trusts the security token, so the request is processed and the 
response is returned “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
3.3.3.2.5.4. Firewall Processing  
 
 Firewalls are a critical component of the current Web security architectures, 
therefore they should be able to continue enforcing boundary processing rules.  
 Figure 3.9 below shows the firewall allowing authorized SOAP messages while 
blocking unauthorized requests. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Firewall Processing SOAP Messages 
 
 In this scenario the firewall examines the SOAP messages to determine if the 
requests is authorized to send messages to the Web service behind itself. It determines 
by examining the security token used to sign the message. If the signature is valid, the 
signing authority is trusted to, and the token says that it does authorize message inside 
the firewall, then the message is allowed. In other scenarios, the firewall can act as a 
security token issuing authority and only allow messages that include proof-of-
possession of a security token issued by the firewall “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
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3.3.3.2.5.5. Issued Security Token  
 
 In the first two steps, the requester communicates with a certifying authority to obtain 
a signed statement of assertions attesting the requester’s identity. Next the requester sends the 
message with the security token and a proof of possession attached to the message. To obtain 
an identity security token, requesters may use existing security protocols or they may leverage 
the Web services security specifications “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Simple Authentication by a Trusted Third Party 
 
3.3.3.2.5.6. Enforcing Business Policy  
 
 In many business processes there are specific policies that must be enforced. For 
example, a service may require that consumers have a certain rating or recognition with 
a specific external party. With web services, these policies can be codified and validated 
automatically, simplifying the overall process. 
 In this scenario, the Web service enables the service provider to interact with 
partners in order to complete business processes. However, the service provider not 
only wants to assure of the identity of the requester, but they also want to make sure that 
the requester has the external party’s recognition. The requester would go to the external 
party and provide its identity security token received from the security token provider in 
order to prove that it is recognized by the external party. The requester then would go to 
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the Web service and provide both tokens and prove its identity and that it is recognized 
and has good standing with the external party “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 An Example in Enforcing Policies 
 
3.3.3.2.5.7. Web Client Communicating Through a Middle-Tier 
Application to a Service  
 
 Consider an example where we have a web client which communicates with a 
middle-tier web application which, in turn securely talks to a Web service in another 
domain. The middle-tier web application, which is Web service aware wants to obtain a 
security token for the Web client in order to talk to the Web service on behalf of the 
Web client.  
 To enable this scenario, when the Web client accesses the middle-tier 
application it is redirected to an associated identity service for authentication possibly 
by basic HTTP authentication mechanism and transport-layer security. Once 
authenticated, the request is redirected back to the middle-tier application. The identity 
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service provides the middle-tier application with a security token asserting the identity 
and the delegations possibly by a query string sent via https. The Web server can now 
use this token to issue requests to the Web service. The Web service processes the 
requests and returns the results to the Web service for possible formatting for display in 
a browser “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Web Client Communicating Through a Middle-Tier Application to a 
Service 
 
3.3.3.2.5.8. Mobile Clients  
 
 The flexibility of the Web services approach enables support for multiple 
cryptographic technologies providing both strong and performant cryptographic 
protection on devices with limited computational and storage capabilities. Similarly it 
enables network operators to provide security proxies, such as network gateways, to act 
on client’s behalf. 
 When a network operator supports mobile clients using Web services security 
specifications, they can configure those clients to send requests via the network 
operator’s gateway. In this scenario the gateway is a SOAP intermediary that actively 
participates in the overall message flow; specifically the network operator is providing a 
value-add encryption algorithm designed for mobile devices. The gateway can augment 
or change the security tokens and quality of protection of the message. Note that the 
flexibility inherent in this Web services security model allows this solution even when 
the device is roaming on a foreign network “(IBM CORPORATION, 2006)”. 
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Figure 3.13 Mobile Clients Accessing a Service Through Gateways 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
4.1. Problem Definition 
 
 Web services typically have large and dynamic requester populations. While 
some services allow anonymous access, others require strong user authentication. 
Invocation of web services commonly occurs between parties between which there is no 
prior relationship and no common security domain. Daily life provides various 
examples in which a trust relationship must be formed prior to performance of tasks. 
Some examples include, request for verification of identity by a bank prior to opening 
an account, verification of citizenship by government before issuing a passport, and 
verification of student status by a university library before lending a book.  
 Web services operate similarly. If a person would like to make an online 
application for credit to a bank, he should provide a security token proving his identity. 
A more advanced scenario would be supplying credit status obtained from a 
governmental institution which monitors citizen’s credit rating, along with the token-of-
proof of a person’s identity. Such a scenario represents the need for a common protocol 
for representing a person’s identity along with various security declarations. Such a 
security token must be standards based and should be verifiable by different authorities 
in different security domains. 
 We propose such an architecture enabling such scenarios in the following 
sections of this chapter. Our proposed architecture introduces a concept which is called 
Security Token Service which issues security tokens on demand to requesters. Such 
tokens may be used for proving identity to other Security Token Services for receiving 
additional security tokens proving other information about the requester thus should be 
valid across different security domains.  
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4.2. Real Life Scenario 
 
 The scenario we’re going to use for demonstration of our proposed architecture 
is a real-life example of the WS-Security scenario we have explained in section 
3.3.3.2.5.6. Our requester is a citizen who would like to apply for a credit account to a 
bank. For his application to be honored, the bank requests the applicant to present two 
security tokens, one obtained from the government verifying his identity, and another 
token from the fictious agency of Board of Credit Rating which rates people’s credit 
status. When both tokens are acquired, the requester invokes the banks Web service and 
presents these tokens. The bank verifies these tokens and according to the credit rating 
of the applicant, and decides to approve the credit request or not. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Credit Application Scenario 
 
4.3. Motivation 
 
 All the actors of the scenario might be implemented using different 
technologies, and interoperability is required between these platforms. Using a 
standards based mechanism for authentication helps ensure interoperability between 
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different platforms. There is also a need for security tokens that are extensible and 
include claims that support additional security functions. The credit rating of the User is 
an important piece of information for the Bank Web Service. Using this piece of 
information, the service decides to honor the User’s credit request. Thus, this piece of 
information is part of the client authorization process on the banking system. 
 The environment includes organizational boundaries that are protected by 
firewalls. We need security tokens that can traverse these boundaries, including passing 
through ports that are commonly enables on firewalls. Also, clients must be able to 
obtain security tokens such that services in a different security domain can be accessed 
by the token that is issues by the token issuer in its own domain. 
 
4.4. Architecture 
 
 The proposed architecture for this scenario involves 4 parties. The first party is 
the requestor which is one of the principal actors of the scenario. The requestor can be 
any kind of application designed to invoke operations on Web services. All of the other 
parties are Web services. All of the parties are located in a different security domain.  
 The communication between parties is performed over HTTP, thus avoiding any 
possible problems regarding firewalls. Our choice of Web service implementation 
utilizes the classic approach of SOAP over HTTP. We use WS-Security in order to 
provide integrity and confidentiality. We used WS-Security SAML token profile for 
interoperability between parties with different security requirements. The last 
component and the heart of the architecture is WS-Trust technology, which enables us 
to build Security Token Services that issue on-demand security tokens that can be used 
for authentication and assertion proof on different domains. 
 36 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The Protocol Stack of the Architecture 
 
4.4.1. Participants 
 
Our scenario involves the following participants: 
• Client: The client application that provides the user’s credentials for 
authentication to obtain a SAML token  and presents the SAML token in the request to 
the Web service. 
• Security Token Service (STS): The STS is the Web service that authenticates 
clients by validating credentials that are presented by a client. The STS issues a security 
token to a client for successful client authentication. 
• Service: The service is the Web service that requires authentication of a client 
prior to authorizing the client. 
• User: The authenticated user represented in the issued SAML token. In the 
SAML token, the authenticated party is referred to as the subject. 
In our scenario there are exactly two Security Token Service’s. The first one 
STS accepts User credentials and issues the security token which identifies the user to 
other parties, and the second one accepts the identity security token, and issues the 
credit rating security token.  
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4.4.2. SAML Token Profile 
 
 SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) tokens are standards based XML 
tokens that are used to exchange security information, including attribute statements, 
authentication decision statements, and authorization decision statements “(OASIS, 
2006)”. SAML tokens are also extensible, meaning that the schema of the token can be 
extended to meet additional requirements. SAML tokens are important for Web service 
security. They provide cross-platform interoperability, and a means for exchanging 
security information between clients and services that do not reside in the same security 
domain.  
 
4.4.3. Web Services Trust 
 
Web Services Trust (WS-Trust) is an extension of the Web Services Security 
specification. Web Services Trust Language defines extensions of the WS-Security that 
provides methods for issuing and exchanging security tokens. It also defines a way to 
establish a trust model “(ANDERSON 2006)”. 
 In order to secure communication between two parties, the two parties must 
exchange security credentials. However, each party needs to determine if they can 
trust the asserted credentials of the other party. The WS-Trust specification defines 
extensions to WS-Security for issuing, exchanging, and validating security tokens, 
and ways to establish and access the presence of trust relationships “(WEB_3 
2006)”. 
 
4.4.4. Token Request and Issuance 
 
SAML tokens are requested by sending a WS-Trust Request Security Token 
(RST) message. In the RST message, the STS receives information about the type of 
token the client is requesting, the intended target for that token based on the service 
to which the client is sending its request message, and the credentials presented for 
authentication. In response to an RST, the STS issues a security token in a WS-Trust 
Request Security Token Response (RSTR) message. The RSTR contains the 
requested security token, and in this implementation, it also includes a proof token 
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containing a copy of a symmetric key to use when signing and encrypting messages 
for the service. 
 
4.4.5. Overview of Key Exchange 
 
Key exchange is the process by which two parties securely establish a secret 
key. The secret key can be used as proof-of-possession, or to encrypt and sign 
messages. If the client and service have no means to directly exchange keys with each 
other in a secure manner, then another party must facilitate the key exchange. In this 
implementation, the STS facilitates key exchange between the client and the service by 
creating a high entropy symmetric key for both parties. 
Each party receives a copy of the symmetric key. The client, as the initiator of 
communication with a service, receives a copy of the symmetric key as plaintext, 
assuming that communication with the STS is secured. In this scenario, the copy of the 
symmetric key is included inside a proof token called a RequestedProofToken. The 
service receives a copy of the symmetric key as part of the security token requested by 
the client from the STS to communicate with that service. The service's copy of the 
symmetric key is encrypted with the public key from its X.509 certificate so only that 
service, as the holder of the private key that is paired with the public key, is the only 
one capable of decrypting its copy of the symmetric key. 
Additionally, the STS signs the security token containing the symmetric key to 
establish data integrity and data origin authentication. This mitigates a man-in-the-
middle attack when an attacker substitutes the symmetric key created by the STS with a 
key of their own, in an attempt to compromise secure communication between the client 
and the service. Also, it binds the identity of the STS to security tokens that it issues, so 
that the service has assurance that the token came from a trusted STS. 
 
4.5. Design 
 
There are 6 steps of the implementation: 
1. The client requests an SAML token from the Identity STS. 
2. The STS processes the RST and sends a response 
3. The client requests an SAML token from the Credit Rating STS 
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4. The STS processes the RST and sends a response 
5. The client sends a request to the bank service 
6. The service processes the request and sends a response 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Scenario Flow 
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Figure 4.4 Sequence Diagram of the Scenario 
 
4.5.1. Process Step 1 – The Client Requests an SAML Token from the 
Identity STS 
 
In the first step, the client initializes a username token which would be sent in 
plain text. Using the username and password information supplied here, the STS would 
be able to authenticate the user. We used plain text, since some directory server 
implementations which could be used as data store for client information requires 
plaintext passwords for client authentication. We will be using message layer security 
before sending the message containing this sensitive information., 
 As the second step, the client initializes an RST message to request a security 
token from the STS. The type of token requested, the target of the the token specified as 
an endpoint reference, and the lifetime of the requested token is included in the 
message. While the client may ask for a desired lifetime, it is up to the the STS to 
decide on the lifetime “(ANDERSON, 2005)”. 
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<wst:RequestSecurityToken 
xmlns:wst="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust"> 
 <wst:TokenType>http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-saml-token-profile- 
  1.1#SAMLV1.1</wst:TokenType> 
 <wst:RequestType>http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust/Issue 
 </wst:RequestType> 
 <wst:Lifetime> 
  <wsu:Expires>2006-12-08T21:54:46Z</wsu:Expires> 
 </wst:Lifetime> 
</wst:RequestSecurityToken> 
 
Example 4.1 RST Message Example 
 
<wst:TokenType> element in the RST message, identifies the type of token 
requested to be issued. In this example, we ask for a token in conformance with the 
SAML token profile. The <wst:Lifetime> element defines the requested lifetime for the 
token. The token can be cached depending on the archiecture of the application, and can 
be used over multiple requests for its lifetime. 
 In step three, the client includes a derived key token in the request message that 
is encrypted with a wrapped symmetric encryption key. The wrapped symmetric key is 
encrypted with the service’s X.509 certificate public key. This key is referred to as an 
encrypted key. Accompanied by a valid UsernameToken, data origin authentication is 
provided when the client uses the derived key token to sign the message. 
 As the last step, the prepared message is sent to the STS. 
 
4.5.2 The STS Processes the RST and Sends a Response 
 
 Upon receiving the message, the STS decrypts the message. First the symmetric 
key is decripted with the STS’s private key. Next the symmetric key is used to decrypt 
the derived key that is used to encrypt and sign the rest of the message. The derived key 
token, that has been decripted, is used to verify message integrity. Also the information 
in the username token included in the message is validated against a data store such as a 
directory service. 
 Once the credentials are validated, an SAML token is initialized by the STS. The 
STS signs the token using its X.509 certificate public key to provide data integrity and 
to provide proof that the token was indeed issued by the STS. 
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<saml:Assertion AssertionID="SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-4100-ad21-13013b975f3c" 
 MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1" 
 Issuer="http://localhost/SamlSecurityTokenService/SamlTokenIssuer.ashx" 
 IssueInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" 
 xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"> 
 <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" NotOnOrAfter="2005-11- 
  30T02:36:03Z"> 
  <saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
   <saml:Audience> 
  
 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing/role/anonymous 
   </saml:Audience> 
  </saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
 </saml:Conditions> 
 <saml:AuthenticationStatement 
  AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password" 
  AuthenticationInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z"> 
  <saml:Subject> 
   <saml:NameIdentifier 
 Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/username">RDAL
APTOP02\wseuser</saml:NameIdentifier> 
   <saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
  <saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:holder-
ofkey</saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
   <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <xenc:EncryptedKey 
    
 xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <xenc:EncryptionMethod 
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-
1_5" /> 
    <KeyInfo 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
    <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
   org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
   EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-
200401-wss-soapmessage-security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs= 
    </wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
   </KeyInfo> 
   <xenc:CipherData> 
 <xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnbOFNj1lxQ
dXCTi7z3aaLu4Xiws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4ygqyB+Mx4J
2lKLYl+rxIOVOVcjbd64/YngQu5AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4=</xenc:CipherValue> 
 
 
Example 4.2 Sample SAML Token 
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   </xenc:CipherData> 
    </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
   </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
  </saml:Subject> 
  <saml:SubjectLocality IPAddress="192.168.0.10" 
 DNSAddress="CLIENTHOST" /> 
 </saml:AuthenticationStatement> 
 <saml:AttributeStatement> 
  <saml:Subject> 
   <saml:NameIdentifier 
 Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/username">RDAL
APTOP02\wseuser 
   </saml:NameIdentifier> 
   <saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
  <saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:holder-
ofkey 
  </saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
 <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
 
 <xenc:EncryptedKeyxmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
 <xenc:EncryptionMethodAlgorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-
1_5" /> 
  <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
   <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
    <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-
soapmessage- 
security-1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs= 
    </wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
   </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
 </KeyInfo> 
 <xenc:CipherData> 
 <xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnbOFNj
1lxQdXCTi7z3aaLu4Xiws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4yg
qyB+Mx4J2lKLYl+rxIOVOVcjbd64/YngQu5AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4= 
 </xenc:CipherValue> 
 </xenc:CipherData> 
 </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
 </ds:KeyInfo> 
 </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
 </saml:Subject> 
 <saml:Attribute AttributeName="group" 
 AttributeNamespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/group
"> 
 
 
Example 4.2 (Continued) 
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  <saml:AttributeValue>BUILTIN\Users 
  </saml:AttributeValue> 
 </saml:Attribute> 
 </saml:AttributeStatement> 
 <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
  <SignedInfo> 
   <ds:CanonicalizationMethod      
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-excc14n#"
     xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
/> 
    <SignatureMethod      
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-
sha1"/> 
   <Reference URI="#SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-4100-ad21-
13013b975f3c"> 
   <Transforms> 
   <Transform 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#envelopedsignature"/> 
   <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-
c14n#" /> 
   </Transforms> 
  <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" 
/> 
  <DigestValue>k2PBIDmwJLlQIh/GA4bVPgk1544=</DigestValue> 
 </Reference> 
 </SignedInfo> 
 <SignatureValue>CZPQJvc2vpjKyio6EEJTQShHGlJff1hZubOWSDCbRrbSFk
K53fOp9Ugulfel6vvs9yZfFJB2ieRAPK3ywUrRWTKvO7vjXP9HRGgrvqGC2PpQNA
EYn7ciBkLM+VoJV5vWfIopVevEYvnxFMFZlJTlLSOr0n+GWYaZuUYFJECfHaE=
</SignatureValue> 
 <KeyInfo> 
  <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
  <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/oasiswss- 
soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" EncodingType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary">  
    vLfjdZyxqw+ztcYkVVQX8wyXp5o= 
  </wsse:KeyIdentifier> 
  </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
 </KeyInfo> 
 </Signature> 
</saml:Assertion> 
 
Example 4.2 (Continued) 
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 The STS generates a high entropy symmetric key that can be used to provide 
proof-of-possession to confirm the subject’s identity and provides a key for the client 
and serviceto sign and encrypt messages. The symmetric key is a hash computation, 
created by the STS using a PSHA1 algorithm. The STS uses an entropy value it 
generates, plus an entropy value provided by the client in the RST message as values for 
key generation. 
 The STS generates the key and encrypts a copy of it with the target service’s 
X.509 certificate public key. The STS determines which X.509 certificate it uses to 
encrypt the symmetric key from a mapping that it maintains in its configuration file. 
This mapping provides traceability from the scope of the security token requested by the 
client in the RST message to the SHA1 Thumbprint of the X.509 certificate used for 
encrypting token data. The STS includes the encrypted symmetric key as a claim in the 
SAML token, and includes a copy of the symmetirc key in a proof token returned back 
to the client in the RSTR.  
 The STS includes the SAML token and a proof token in a RSTR message back 
to the client. The proof token contains a copy of the symmetric key that was added to 
the SAML token. Unlike the copy of the symmetric key in the SAML token, the copy in 
the proof token is not encrypted using the target services X.509 certificate public 
key.Instead, the key in the proof token is plaintext, though the RSTR is secured. The 
client caches the proof token to derive encryption and signing keys for securing 
messages exchanged with the service. 
 
4.5.3. The client requests an SAML token from the Credit Rating STS 
 
 The SAML token received from the Identity STS is attached to the RST message 
which is going to sent to the Credit Rating STS. The client’s copy of the symmetric key 
contained in the proof token received with the message is used to derive a signing key 
to sign the message. The signing key is created using PSHA1 algorithm which produces 
a hash value from the symmetric key, and a concatenation of a label and a nonce. Key 
derivation allows fresh key material to be used each time messages are signed to reduce 
the success of offline analysis by attackers. Another key is derived from the symmetric 
key. The encryption key is used to encrypt sensitive parts of the message such as 
message body and signature. The prepared message is sent to the Credit Rating STS. 
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4.5.4. The Credit Rating STS Processes the RST and Sends a Response 
 
 The message is decrypted as explained in first paragraph of section 4.5.2. The 
service computes the derived signing key from the symmetric key in the SAML token 
and verifies the message signature. This provides data origin authentication, as it gives 
the service assurance that the message was not tampered with during transit, and that it 
originated from the client as the holder of the symmetric key included in the SAML 
token. 
 Next the Credit Rating STS checks the certificate identifier of the X.509 
certificate the Identity STS used to sign the SAML token against a list of trusted token 
issuers. The Credit Rating STS also verifies that the required parts of the token are 
present and the validity period of the token. The service prepares a new extended 
SAML token which also includes the credit rating of the user.  
 A new RSTR message is prepared as explained in section 4.5.2. This new 
message includes the SAML token prepared by the Credit Rating STS. The message is 
sent back to the client. 
 
4.5.5. The client sends a request to the bank service 
 
 Upon receiving the RSTS from the Credit Rating STS, the client receives the 
second SAML token with the custom assertion of the user’s credit rating. The client 
prepares a service request from the bank web service. For preparing this message, the 
process explained in section 4.5.3 is repeated only this time the symmetric key prepared 
using the information in the second SAML token prepared by the Credit Rating STS is 
used. The second SAML token is attached to this message and sent to the bank web 
service. 
 
4.5.6. The Service Processes the Request and Sends a Response 
 
 The service computes the derived key used to encrypt the message from the 
symmetric key in the SAML token. The derived encryption key is then used to decrypt 
the request message signature and body. Next, the service computes the derived signing 
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key from the symmetric key in the SAML token and verifies the message signature. 
This provides data origin authentication, as it gives the service assurance that the 
message was not tampered with during transit, and that it originated from the client as 
the holder of the symmetric key included in the SAML token. 
 The bank web service checks the certificate identifier of the X.509 certificate the 
STS used to sign the SAML token against a list of trusted token issuers. If the SAML 
token is not signed by a trusted token issuer, an exception is thrown.  
 As the last step of the process, the service applies business logic using input 
from the SAML token, namely the identity credentials and the credit rating from the 
Credit Rating Service to decide on the outcome of the request. The response, signed and 
encrypted with keys derived from the symmetric key that the service obtained from the 
SAML token is sent back to the client. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 With this thesis, we have laid the foundations for a more comprehensive 
framework for securing Web services. Our proposed architecture demonstrates an 
example of trust brokering for various purposes. The fact that each of the actors are 
located in different security domains, can be considered a hint for implementing a 
federation framework for service oriented architectures. Also Web services single sign 
on can be implemented by caching the received SAML token.  
 There are other extension points which are outside the scope of this thesis. One 
such extension is implementing secure conversation between actors. Such a need would 
arise if the conversation between actors includes more than one interaction. Secure 
conversation can be implemented by establishing security context tokens and using 
these tokens for securing the conversation.  
 Throughout this thesis, we have assumed that the parties involved in the 
architecture, knew beforehand the requirements of other actors. This might not be the 
case when a large scale service oriented architecture is built. Policy frameworks such as 
Web Services Policy technology can be implemented for discovery of requirements of 
actors.  
 Other extensions such as support for different security tokens like Kerberos 
tokens can be added to this architecture for supporting other systems using them can be 
also added to this architecture.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
GLOSSARY “(WEB_1 2006)” 
 
Access  
To interact with a system entity in order to manipulate, use, gain knowledge of, 
and/or obtain a representation of some or all of a system entity's resources. [RFC 2828]  
access control  
Protection of resources against unauthorized access; a process by which use of 
resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only authorized 
system entities according to that policy. [RFC 2828]  
 
Access Control Information  
Any information used for access control purposes, including contextual 
information. [X.812]  
Contextual information might include source IP address, encryption strength, the 
type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Portions of access control 
information may be specific to the request itself, some may be associated with the 
connection via which the request is transmitted, and others (for example, time of day) 
may be "environmental". [RFC 2829]  
 
Access Rights  
A description of the type of authorized interactions a subject can have with a 
resource. Examples include read, write, execute, add, modify, and delete. [WSIA 
Glossary]  
 
Actor  
A person or organization that may be the owner of agents that either seek to use 
Web services or provide Web services. 
A physical or conceptual entity that can perform actions. Examples: people; 
companies; machines; running software. An actor can take on (or implement) one or 
more roles. An actor at one level of abstraction may be viewed as a role at a lower level 
of abstraction.  
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Agent  
An agent is a program acting on behalf of a person or organization. (This 
definition is a specialization of the definition in [Web Arch]. It corresponds to the 
notion of software agent in [Web Arch].) 
 
Anonymity  
The quality or state of being anonymous, which is the condition of having a 
name or identity that is unknown or concealed. [RFC 2828]  
 
Architecture  
The software architecture of a program or computing system is the structure or 
structures of the system. This structure includes software components, the externally 
visible properties of those components, the relationships among them and the 
constraints on their use. (based on the definition of architecture in [Soft Arch Pract]) 
A software architecture is an abstraction of the run-time elements of a software 
system during some phase of its operation. A system may be composed of many levels 
of abstraction and many phases of operation, each with its own software architecture. 
[Fielding]  
 
Artifact  
A piece of digital information. An artifact may be any size, and may be 
composed of other artifacts. Examples of artifacts: a message; a URI; an XML 
document; a PNG image; a bit stream. 
 
Asynchronous  
An interaction is said to be asynchronous when the associated messages are 
chronologically and procedurally decoupled. For example, in a request-response 
interaction, the client agent can process the response at some indeterminate point in the 
future when its existence is discovered. Mechanisms to do this include polling, 
notification by receipt of another message, etc. 
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Attribute  
A distinct characteristic of an object. An object's attributes are said to describe 
the object. Objects' attributes are often specified in terms of their physical traits, such as 
size, shape, weight, and color, etc., for real-world objects. Objects in cyberspace might 
have attributes describing size, type of encoding, network address, etc. [WSIA 
Glossary]  
 
Audit Guard  
An audit guard is a mechanism used on behalf of an owner that monitors actions 
and agents to verify the satisfaction of obligations.  
 
Authentication  
Authentication is the process of verifying that a potential partner in a 
conversation is capable of representing a person or organization. 
 
Authorization  
The process of determining, by evaluating applicable access control information, 
whether a subject is allowed to have the specified types of access to a particular 
resource. Usually, authorization is in the context of authentication. Once a subject is 
authenticated, it may be authorized to perform different types of access. [STG]  
 
Binding  
An association between an interface, a concrete protocol and a data format. A 
binding specifies the protocol and data format to be used in transmitting messages 
defined by the associated interface. [WSD Reqs]  
The mapping of an interface and its associated operations to a particular concrete 
message format and transmission protocol. 
See also SOAP binding. 
 
Capability  
A capability is a named piece of functionality (or feature) that is declared as 
supported or requested by an agent. 
 53 
Choreography  
A choreography defines the sequence and conditions under which multiple 
cooperating independent agents exchange messages in order to perform a task to 
achieve a goal state. 
Web Services Choreography concerns the interactions of services with their 
users. Any user of a Web service, automated or otherwise, is a client of that service. 
These users may, in turn, be other Web Services, applications or human beings. 
Transactions among Web Services and their clients must clearly be well defined at the 
time of their execution, and may consist of multiple separate interactions whose 
composition constitutes a complete transaction. This composition, its message 
protocols, interfaces, sequencing, and associated logic, is considered to be a 
choreography. [WSC Reqs] 
 
Component  
A component is a software object, meant to interact with other components, 
encapsulating certain functionality or a set of functionalities. A component has a clearly 
defined interface and conforms to a prescribed behavior common to all components 
within an architecture. [CCA T&D] 
A component is an abstract unit of software instructions and internal state that 
provides a transformation of data via its interface. [Fielding] 
A component is a unit of architecture with defined boundaries. 
 
Confidentiality  
Assuring information will be kept secret, with access limited to appropriate 
persons. [NSA Glossary]  
 
Configuration  
A collection of properties which may be changed. A property may influence the 
behavior of an entity. 
 
Connection  
A transport layer virtual circuit established between two programs for the 
purpose of communication. [RFC 2616]  
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Control  
To cause a desired change in state. Management systems may control the life 
cycle of manageable Web services or information flow such as messages. 
 
Conversation  
A Web service conversation involves maintaining some state during an 
interaction that involves multiple messages and/or participants. 
 
Credentials  
Data that is transferred to establish a claimed principal identity. [X.800]  
 
Delivery Policy  
A delivery policy is a policy that constrains the methods by which messages are 
delivered by the message transport. 
 
Digital Signature  
A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and appended to a data object 
in such a way that any recipient of the data can use the signature to verify the data's 
origin and integrity. (See: data origin authentication service, data integrity service, 
digitized signature, electronic signature, signer.) [RFC 2828] 
 
Discovery  
The act of locating a machine-processable description of a Web service-related 
resource that may have been previously unknown and that meets certain functional 
criteria. It involves matching a set of functional and other criteria with a set of resource 
descriptions. The goal is to find an appropriate Web service-related resource. 
 
Discovery Service  
A discovery service is a service that enables agents to retrieve Web services-
related resource description. 
 
Document  
Any data that can be represented in a digital form. [UeB Glossary] 
 55 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)  
The automated exchange of any predefined and structured data for business 
among information systems of two or more organizations. [ISO/IEC 14662] 
 
Domain  
A domain is an identified set of agents and/or resources that is subject to the 
constraints of one of more policies.  
 
Encryption  
Cryptographic transformation of data (called "plaintext") into a form (called 
"ciphertext") that conceals the data's original meaning to prevent it from being known or 
used. If the transformation is reversible, the corresponding reversal process is called 
"decryption", which is a transformation that restores encrypted data to its original state. 
[RFC 2828] 
 
End Point  
An association between a binding and a network address, specified by a URI, 
that may be used to communicate with an instance of a service. An end point indicates a 
specific location for accessing a service using a specific protocol and data format. 
[WSD Reqs]  
 
Gateway  
An agent that terminates a message on an inbound interface with the intent of 
presenting it through an outbound interface as a new message. Unlike a proxy, a 
gateway receives messages as if it were the final receiver for the message. Due to 
possible mismatches between the inbound and outbound interfaces, a message may be 
modified and may have some or all of its meaning lost during the conversion process. 
For example, an HTTP PUT has no equivalent in SMTP. 
Note: a gateway may or may not be a SOAP node; however a gateway is never a 
SOAP intermediary, since gateways terminate messages and SOAP intermediaries relay 
them instead. Being a gateway is typically a permanent role, whilst being a SOAP 
intermediary is message specific. 
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Idempotent  
Property of an interaction whose results and side-effects are the same whether it 
is done one or multiple times. [RFC 2616] 
Safe interactions are inherently idempotent. 
 
Identifier  
An identifier is an unambiguous name for a resource. 
 
Initial SOAP Sender  
The SOAP sender that originates a SOAP message at the starting point of a 
SOAP message path. 
 
Integrity  
Assuring information will not be accidentally or maliciously altered or 
destroyed. [NSA Glossary]  
 
Loose Coupling  
Coupling is the dependency between interacting systems. This dependency can 
be decomposed into real dependency and artificial dependency: 
Real dependency is the set of features or services that a system consumes from 
other systems. The real dependency always exists and cannot be reduced. 
Artificial dependency is the set of factors that a system has to comply with in 
order to consume the features or services provided by other systems. Typical artificial 
dependency factors are language dependency, platform dependency, API dependency, 
etc. Artificial dependency always exists, but it or its cost can be reduced. 
Loose coupling describes the configuration in which artificial dependency has 
been reduced to the minimum. 
 
Manageable Service  
A Web service becomes a manageable service with additional semantics, policy 
statements, and monitoring and control (or management) capabilities (exposed via a 
management interface) all for the purpose of managing the service.  
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Management  
The utilization of the management capabilities by the management system in 
order to perform monitoring of values, tracking of states and control of entities in order 
to produce and maintain a stable operational environment. 
 
Management Capability  
Capabilities that a Web service has for the purposes of controlling or monitoring 
the service, and that can be exposed to a management system for the sole purpose of 
managing the service. 
 
Management Interface  
Interface through which the management capabilities of a service are exposed. 
 
Management Policy  
Policy associated with a Web service solely for the purpose of describing the 
management obligations and permissions for the service. 
 
Management Semantics  
The management semantics of a service augment the semantics of a service with 
management-specific semantics. These management semantics form the contract 
between the provider entity and the requester entity that expresses the effects and 
requirements pertaining to the management and management policies for a service. 
 
Message  
A message is the basic unit of data sent from one Web services agent to another 
in the context of Web services. 
The basic unit of communication between a Web service and a requester: data to 
be communicated to or from a Web service as a single logical transmission. [WSD 
Reqs]  
See also SOAP message. 
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Message Correlation  
Message correlation is the association of a message with a context. Message 
correlation ensures that the requester agent can match the reply with the request, 
especially when multiple replies may be possible. 
 
Message Exchange Pattern (MEP)  
A Message Exchanage Pattern (MEP) is a template, devoid of application 
semantics, that describes a generic pattern for the exchange of messages between 
agents. It describes the relationships (e.g., temporal, causal, sequential, etc.) of multiple 
messages exchanged in conformance with the pattern, as well as the normal and 
abnormal termination of any message exchange conforming to the pattern. 
See SOAP message exchange pattern (MEP). 
 
Message Receiver  
A message receiver is an agent that receives a message. 
 
Message Reliability  
Message reliability is the degree of certainty that a message will be delivered 
and that sender and receiver will both have the same understanding of the delivery 
status. 
 
Message Sender  
A message sender is the agent that transmits a message. 
 
Message Transport  
A message transport is a mechanism that may be used by agents to deliver 
messages. 
 
Non-Repudiation  
Method by which the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the 
recipient is assured of the sender's identity, so that neither can later deny having 
processed the data. [INFOSEC Glossary]  
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Obligation  
An obligation is a kind of policy that prescribes actions and/or states of an agent 
and/or resource.  
 
Operation  
A set of messages related to a single Web service action. [WSD Reqs]  
 
Orchestration  
An orchestration defines the sequence and conditions in which one Web service 
invokes other Web services in order to realize some useful function. I.e., an 
orchestration is the pattern of interactions that a Web service agent must follow in order 
to achieve its goal.  
 
Permission  
A permission is a kind of policy that prescribes the allowed actions and states of 
an agent and/or resource.  
 
Permission Guard  
A permission guard is a mechanism deployed on behalf of an owner to enforce 
permission policies.  
 
Person Or Organization  
A person or organization may be the owner of agents that provide or request 
Web services. 
 
Policy  
A policy is a constraint on the behavior of agents or person or organization. 
 
Policy Guard  
A policy guard is a mechanism that enforces one or more policies. It is deployed 
on behalf of an owner.  
 
Principal  
A system entity whose identity can be authenticated. [X.811]  
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Privacy Policy  
A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a person or organization 
collects, processes (uses) and discloses another party's personal data as a result of an 
interaction.  
 
Provider Agent  
An agent that is capable of and empowered to perform the actions associated 
with a service on behalf of its owner — the provider entity.  
 
Provider Entity  
The person or organization that is providing a Web service.  
 
Protocol  
A set of formal rules describing how to transmit data, especially across a 
network. Low level protocols define the electrical and physical standards to be 
observed, bit- and byte-ordering and the transmission and error detection and correction 
of the bit stream. High level protocols deal with the data formatting, including the 
syntax of messages, the terminal to computer dialogue, character sets, sequencing of 
messages etc. [FOLDOC] 
 
Proxy  
An agent that relays a message between a requester agent and a provider agent, 
appearing to the Web service to be the requester.  
 
Quality Of Service  
Quality of Service is an obligation accepted and advertised by a provider entity 
to service consumers.  
 
Reference Architecture  
A reference architecture is the generalized architecture of several end systems 
that share one or more common domains. The reference architecture defines the 
infrastructure common to the end systems and the interfaces of components that will be 
included in the end systems. The reference architecture is then instantiated to create a 
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software architecture of a specific system. The definition of the reference architecture 
facilitates deriving and extending new software architectures for classes of systems. A 
reference architecture, therefore, plays a dual role with regard to specific target software 
architectures. First, it generalizes and extracts common functions and configurations. 
Second, it provides a base for instantiating target systems that use that common base 
more reliably and cost effectively. [Ref Arch]  
 
Registry  
Authoritative, centrally controlled store of information. 
 
Requester Agent  
A software agent that wishes to interact with a provider agent in order to request 
that a task be performed on behalf of its owner — the requester entity.  
 
Requester Entity  
The person or organization that wishes to use a provider entity's Web service.  
 
Safe  
Property of an interaction which does not have any significance of taking an 
action other than retrieval of information. [RFC 2616] 
security administration  
Configuring, securing and/or deploying of systems or applications enabling a 
security domain. 
 
Security Architecture  
A plan and set of principles for an administrative domain and its security 
domains that describe the security services that a system is required to provide to meet 
the needs of its users, the system elements required to implement the services, and the 
performance levels required in the elements to deal with the threat environment. A 
complete security architecture for a system addresses administrative security, 
communication security, computer security, emanations security, personnel security, 
and physical security, and prescribes security policies for each. A complete security 
architecture needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental threats. 
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A security architecture should explicitly evolve over time as an integral part of its 
administrative domain's evolution. [RFC 2828]  
 
Security Auditing  
A service that reliably and securely records security-related events producing an 
audit trail enabling the reconstruction and examination of a sequence of events. Security 
events could include authentication events, policy enforcement decisions, and others. 
The resulting audit trail may be used to detect attacks, confirm compliance with policy, 
deter abuse, or other purposes.  
 
Security Domain  
An environment or context that is defined by security models and a security 
architecture, including a set of resources and set of system entities that are authorized to 
access the resources. One or more security domains may reside in a single 
administrative domain. The traits defining a given security domain typically evolve over 
time. [RFC 2828]  
 
Security Mechanism  
A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that can be used in a system 
to implement a security service that is provided by or within the system.  
 
Security Model  
A schematic description of a set of entities and relationships by which a 
specified set of security services are provided by or within a system. [RFC 2828]  
 
Security Policy  
A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization 
provides security services to protect resources. Security policies are components of 
security architectures. Significant portions of security policies are implemented via 
security services, using security policy expressions. [RFC 2828]  
 
Security Policy Expression  
A mapping of principal identities and/or attributes thereof with allowable 
actions. Security policy expressions are often essentially access control lists. [STG]  
 63 
Security Service  
A processing or communication service that is provided by a system to give a 
specific kind of protection to resources, where said resources may reside with said 
system or reside with other systems, for example, an authentication service or a PKI-
based document attribution and authentication service. A security service is a superset 
of AAA services. Security services typically implement portions of security policies and 
are implemented via security mechanisms. [RFC 2828]  
 
Service  
A service is an abstract resource that represents a capability of performing tasks 
that form a coherent functionality from the point of view of providers entities and 
requester entities. To be used, a service must be realized by a concrete provider agent. 
WSDL service: A collection of end points. [WSD Reqs]  
See Web service. 
 
Service Description  
A service description is a set of documents that describe the interface to and 
semantics of a service. 
 
Service Interface  
A service interface is the abstract boundary that a service exposes. It defines the 
types of messages and the message exchange patterns that are involved in interacting 
with the service, together with any conditions implied by those messages. 
A logical grouping of operations. An interface represents an abstract service 
type, independent of transmission protocol and data format. [WSD Reqs] 
 
Service Intermediary  
A service intermediary is a Web service whose main role is to transform 
messages in a value-added way. (From a messaging point of view, an intermediary 
processes messages en route from one agent to another.) Specifically, we say that a 
service intermediary is a service whose outgoing messages are equivalent to its 
incoming messages in some application-defined sense. 
See SOAP intermediary. 
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Service Provider  
See provider agent and provider entity. See also the discussion about service 
provider in [WS Arch]. 
 
Service Requester  
See requester agent and requester entity. See also the discussion about service 
requester in [WS Arch]. 
 
Service Role  
An abstract set of tasks which is identified to be relevant by a person or 
organization offering a service. Service roles are also associated with particular aspects 
of messages exchanged with a service. 
 
Service Semantics  
The semantics of a service is the behavior expected when interacting with the 
service. The semantics expresses a contract (not necessarily a legal contract) between 
the provider entity and the requester entity. It expresses the effect of invoking the 
service. A service semantics may be formally described in a machine readable form, 
identified but not formally defined, or informally defined via an out of band agreement 
between the provider and the requester entity. 
 
Service-Oriented Architecture  
A set of components which can be invoked, and whose interface descriptions can 
be published and discovered. 
 
Session  
A lasting interaction between system entities, often involving a user, typified by 
the maintenance of some state of the interaction for the duration of the interaction. 
[WSIA Glossary]  
Such an interaction may not be limited to a single connection between the 
system entities. 
 65 
SOAP  
The formal set of conventions governing the format and processing rules of a 
SOAP message. These conventions include the interactions among SOAP nodes 
generating and accepting SOAP messages for the purpose of exchanging information 
along a SOAP message path. 
 
SOAP Application  
A software entity that produces, consumes or otherwise acts upon SOAP 
messages in a manner conforming to the SOAP processing model. 
 
SOAP Binding  
The formal set of rules for carrying a SOAP message within or on top of another 
protocol (underlying protocol) for the purpose of exchange. Examples of SOAP 
bindings include carrying a SOAP message within an HTTP entity-body, or over a TCP 
stream. 
 
SOAP Body  
A collection of zero or more element information items targeted at an ultimate 
SOAP receiver in the SOAP message path. 
 
SOAP Envelope  
The outermost element information item of a SOAP message. 
 
SOAP Fault  
A SOAP element information item which contains fault information generated 
by a SOAP node. 
 
SOAP Feature  
An extension of the SOAP messaging framework typically associated with the 
exchange of messages between communicating SOAP nodes. Examples of features 
include "reliability", "security", "correlation", "routing", and the concept of message 
exchange patterns. 
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SOAP Header  
A collection of zero or more SOAP header blocks each of which might be 
targeted at any SOAP receiver within the SOAP message path. 
 
SOAP Header Block  
An element information item used to delimit data that logically constitutes a 
single computational unit within the SOAP header. The type of a SOAP header block is 
identified by the fully qualified name of the header block element information item. 
 
SOAP Intermediary  
A SOAP intermediary is both a SOAP receiver and a SOAP sender and is 
targetable from within a SOAP message. It processes the SOAP header blocks targeted 
at it and acts to forward a SOAP message towards an ultimate SOAP receiver. 
 
SOAP Message  
The basic unit of communication between SOAP nodes. 
 
SOAP Message Exchange Pattern (MEP)  
A template for the exchange of SOAP messages between SOAP nodes enabled 
by one or more underlying SOAP protocol bindings. A SOAP MEP is an example of a 
SOAP feature. 
 
SOAP Message Path  
The set of SOAP nodes through which a single SOAP message passes. This 
includes the initial SOAP sender, zero or more SOAP intermediaries, and an ultimate 
SOAP receiver. 
 
SOAP Node  
The embodiment of the processing logic necessary to transmit, receive, process 
and/or relay a SOAP message, according to the set of conventions defined by this 
recommendation. A SOAP node is responsible for enforcing the rules that govern the 
exchange of SOAP messages. It accesses the services provided by the underlying 
protocols through one or more SOAP bindings. 
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SOAP Receiver  
A SOAP node that accepts a SOAP message. 
 
SOAP Role  
A SOAP node's expected function in processing a message. A SOAP node can 
act in multiple roles. 
 
SOAP Sender  
A SOAP node that transmits a SOAP message. 
State  
A set of attributes representing the properties of a component at some point in 
time. 
 
Synchronous  
An interaction is said to be synchronous when the participating agents must be 
available to receive and process the associated messages from the time the interaction is 
initiated until all messages are actually received or some failure condition is determined. 
The exact meaning of "available to receive the message" depends on the characteristics 
of the participating agents (including the transfer protocol it uses); it may, but does not 
necessarily, imply tight time synchronization, blocking a thread, etc. 
 
System Entity  
An active element of a computer/network system. For example, an automated 
process or set of processes, a subsystem, a person or group of persons that incorporates 
a distinct set of functionality. [RFC 2828]  
 
Transaction  
Transaction is a feature of the architecture that supports the coordination of 
results or operations on state in a multi-step interaction. The fundamental characteristic 
of a transaction is the ability to join multiple actions into the same unit of work, such 
that the actions either succeed or fail as a unit. 
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Ultimate SOAP Receiver  
The SOAP receiver that is a final destination of a SOAP message. It is 
responsible for processing the contents of the SOAP body and any SOAP header blocks 
targeted at it. In some circumstances, a SOAP message might not reach an ultimate 
SOAP receiver, for example because of a problem at a SOAP intermediary. An ultimate 
SOAP receiver cannot also be a SOAP intermediary for the same SOAP message. 
 
Usage Auditing  
Service that reliably and securely records usage-related events producing an 
audit trail enabling the reconstruction and examination of a sequence of events. Usage 
events could include resource allocation events and resource freeing events. 
 
Web Service  
There are many things that might be called "Web services" in the world at large. 
However, for the purpose of this Working Group and this architecture, and without 
prejudice toward other definitions, we will use the following definition: 
A Web service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-
to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web service in 
a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP-messages, typically conveyed using 
HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards.  
 
 
 
 
